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Article
THE LIMITS OF LAW IN THE EVALUATION
OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Emad H. Atiq* & Erin L. Millerti
Abstract
Capital sentencers are constitutionally required to "consider" any
mitigating evidence presented by the defense. Under Lockett v. Ohio and its
progeny, neither statutes nor common law can exclude mitigating factors
from the sentencer's consideration or place conditions on when such factors
may be considered. We argue that the principle underlying this line of
doctrine is broader than courts have so far recognized. A natural starting
point for our analysis is judicial treatment of evidence that the defendant
suffered severe environmental deprivation ("SED"), such as egregious child
abuse or poverty. SED has played a central role in the Court's elaboration
of the "consideration" requirement. It is often given what we call
"restrictive consideration" because its mitigating value is conditioned on a
finding that the deprivation, or a diagnosable illness resulting from it, was
an immediate cause of the crime. We point out, first, that the line of
constitutional doctrine precluding statutory and precedential constraints on
the consideration of mitigating evidence rests on a more general principle
that "consideration" demands an individualized, moral-as opposed to
legalistic-appraisal of the evidence. When judges restrict the moral
principles under which they evaluate the mitigating weight of evidence on
the basis of precedent or even judicial custom, they fail to give a reasoned,
moral response to the evidence. We articulate a three-factor test for when
legalistic thinking of this sort prevents a judge from satisfying the
constitutional requirement. Restrictive consideration of SED evidence, in
many jurisdictions, is a product of legal convention and thus fails the test.
Second, we contend that, when the capital sentencer is a judge rather than a
jury, she has a special responsibility to refrain from restrictive
consideration of mitigating evidence. The Constitution requires that death
sentences must be consistent with community values. Unrestricted
consideration of evidence-evaluating its mitigating weight in light of a
range of moral principles-ensures that the diverse moral views of the
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community are brought to bear on the capital question.
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"The sentencer must . . . be able to consider and give effect to [mitigating]
evidence in imposing a sentence, so that the sentence imposed . . . reflects a
reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime."2
INTRODUCTION
It is well-established law, since Eddings v. Oklahoma, that evidence of
"severe environmental deprivation" (SED)-such as egregious child abuse,
neglect, or poverty-must be "considered" by judges as a mitigating factor
during the penalty phase of capital trials.3 In Smith v. Texas, the Supreme
Court found unconstitutional under Eddings a judicial practice of excluding
SED from consideration as a potential mitigating factor unless the
deprivation suffered met a narrowly defined condition.4 Rather than
broadening their review of SED, the judges who previously engaged in this
practice of outright exclusion switched to a subtly different practice: when
SED evidence is presented by the defense, judges declare that they are
"considering" SED as a mitigating factor but assign it little to no mitigating
weight unless it meets the very same condition.5 Mitigating factors that
receive little to no weight make no difference, as far as we can tell, to the
defendant's sentence.6 The practice raises the question: is judicial treatment
of SED evidence consistent with the kind of "consideration" the
Constitution requires?
Courts of appeals declined to take a position on the issue-until the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in McKinney v. Ryan in December 2015. In
McKinney, the Arizona Supreme Court had dismissed SED evidence as non-
mitigating because it did not "causally contribute" to the capital crime,
claiming that this counted as "consideration" under Eddings. A divided
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, disagreed, finding that the state court failed
"to evaluate and give appropriate weight" to that evidence, contrary to
Eddings, because the causal prerequisite it invoked mirrored the one that,
until Smith, it had used to wholly exclude most SED evidence from
consideration.8 In an impassioned dissent, Judge Bea described the notion
that the Arizona Supreme Court "did not really consider [the evidence] even
though it used the word 'considering"' as "nonsense." 9 He argued that
"giving little or no weight to such evidence [after consideration] is perfectly
2 Pery v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 788 (2001) (citations omitted).
455 U.S. 104, 113 (1982); see also id. at 114-15 ("Just as the State may not by statute
preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence .... The sentencer . . . may determine the
weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration."). Henceforth, we use the same Eddings pin citation for all
grammatical forms of "consider."
4 Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004) (per curiam).
s See discussion infra Part 1.
6 See discussion infra Parts I, II.
McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 39
(2016).
Id. at 820, 823.
Id. at 847 (Bea, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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permissible under Eddings." 0
Two dueling approaches to the "consideration" of deprivation evidence
underpin this dispute. A fact offered as mitigating by the defendant can
only be judged mitigating based on a principle concerning moral
responsibility or punishment. On some such principles, the fact might have
greater mitigating value than on others. For instance, evidence of an act of
kindness of the defendant might be mitigating given the principle that mercy
is appropriate towards individuals of decent moral character or the principle
that even murderers who may be rehabilitated should be spared execution.
When a sentencer draws on just one normative principle, or an unduly
restricted range of plausible principles, to explain the evidence's mitigating
value, they engage in what we call restrictive consideration.12 Restrictive
consideration is not necessarily unlawful, but the consideration found
inadequate in McKinney was both restrictive and unlawful. In that case, and
many others in Arizona, the defendant's deprivation was deemed to have
mitigating value only if it bore a very particular causal relation to the
criminal act: namely, that the SED was an immediate or "specific" cause of
the act. (For example, SED causes the crime in the relevant sense when it
results in a psychological disorder like PTSD that results in an irresistible
impulse or motive to commit the crime in question.) This restriction seems
to rest on the principle that a defendant's prior deprivation only diminishes
his punishment-worthiness when the deprivation directly causes his
intention to commit the crime and negates his responsibility for the crime.
The McKinney majority sought less restricted consideration, which would
have appraised the mitigating significance of the deprivation based on
alternative moral principles. In what follows, we demonstrate that numerous
such alternative principles exist and are not only plausible but widely
accepted.
We welcome McKinney as a clarification of the Eddings consideration
doctrine. We argue that implicit in Eddings and its progeny is the attractive
ideal that it is unconstitutional for sentencers to limit the moral principles
under which they consider mitigating evidence for legalistic reasons; in
evaluating which moral principles bear on the mitigating significance of
evidence presented by the defense, the sentencer should rely exclusively
on moral reasoning. Eddings explicitly held that capital sentencers must not
be constrained by legal norms from considering any relevant mitigating
evidence. 3 The holding was an extension of Lockett v. Ohio, which held
that statutes excluding any mitigating factors from the sentencer's
consideration are unconstitutional.1 4 Eddings elaborated that the sentencer's
consideration can be unconstitutionally constrained not just by statutes but
also other sources of law, like judicial custom. And legal rules can operate
as unconstitutional constraints not just by requiring outright exclusion of
'
0 Id. at 843-44 (Bea, J., dissenting).
See discussion infra Parts 1, 11.
12By plausible principles, we mean those that are believed by significant numbers of reasonable
persons and should be known to the sentencer. See discussion infra Part I.
13 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
14 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1976).
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mitigating factors from consideration, but by subtly pressuring judges to
limit the conditions under which evidence counts as mitigating. A later case,
Tennard v. Dretke, clarified that judge-made rules or conventions limiting
when mitigating evidence can be considered also amount to unconstitutional
constraints on consideration. 5  We argue that Lockett, Eddings, and
Tennard, together, stand for the proposition that a practice of restrictive
consideration of mitigating evidence where the restrictions are imposed
because judges feel bound by the law (in a sense to be made precise) is
unconstitutional.
McKinney took a step toward this broader doctrinal interpretation by
finding an Eddings violation in restrictive consideration of SED induced by
an informal judicial practice. However, because the Ninth Circuit based its
decision on historical facts specific to the Arizona practice, it missed an
opportunity to articulate a general rule for identifying when restrictive
consideration counts as unconstitutionally induced by a legal custom or
practice under Eddings. We seize the opportunity McKinney missed,
offering a three-factor test for just this purpose that applies most obviously
to the review of SED evidence and potentially to the review of mitigating
evidence more broadly.
We also present an argument, grounded in an original interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent, that restrictive consideration of mitigating
evidence may be inherently or per se unconstitutional when the sentencer is
a judge, even if the judge was not acting on the basis of any assumed legal
rules. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized since Gregg v. Georgia, a
death sentence cannot be constitutionally legitimate unless it enjoys broad-
based communal support.16 This is in part why juries-representing a cross-
section of their community-are so extensively involved in the
administration of capital punishment in nearly every jurisdiction in the
United States legal system. We argue that, because of their comparative
disadvantage at fulfilling this constitutional function, judges who issue death
sentences have a unique responsibility to consider each piece of mitigating
evidence in light of different moral theories that give it the broadest
potential mitigating value; and to give significant weight to the evidence if,
under some such theories, it has significant mitigating value. Doing so does
a better job ensuring that the death penalty if issued would enjoy broad
based communal support than a practice of restrictive consideration (even if
" Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004).
16 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) ("Jury. sentencing has been considered desirable
in capital cases in order 'to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' (citation omitted)); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1976) (reflecting on the importance on the moral views of society
in the administration of death penalty). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987)
(outlining the capital jury's task of expressing "the conscience of the community on the ultimate question
of life or death"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) ("[T]he decision that capital punishment
may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death.") (quotation marks omitted) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184). Accord Steve
Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79, 144 n.232 (2002) ("[T]he
case law as a whole indicates that communal values must play a role in capital sentencing.").
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morally motivated). Given the common and (we argue) reasonable belief
that SED is inherently mitigating, judges should give unrestricted
consideration to deprivation evidence and assign substantial (though not
necessarily dispositive) mitigating weight to it.
While the active controversy over what "consideration" requires has
centered in the Ninth Circuit, the question is even more pressing in other
jurisdictions. Although most states have shifted to exclusive jury sentencing
in capital cases, Alabama, until last year, continued to allow death
sentencing by a single judge through a jury override provision, and required
no deference to the jury's preference for life; over a hundred inmates on
Alabama's death row were subject to this provision and might still appeal
their sentences.' 7 Alabama is in the Eleventh Circuit, which has shown no
signs of following the Ninth's lead in giving teeth to Eddings 's
"consideration" requirement. Prior to a significant shift in Supreme Court
doctrine in 2002, many other states also employed judicial capital
sentencing, and likely still have inmates on death row who were sentenced
by judges under these older regimes.' 8
In Part I, we illustrate how restrictive consideration can become an
entrenched judicial practice, using examples of SED review from Arizona,
Alabama, and Florida. We attempt to understand the underlying moral
principle, called here the "causal nexus theory," which treats SED as
mitigating when it has effects at the time of the crime that undermine the
defendant's control over his act, similar to those of a serious mental illness.
We find, however, that judges in these districts offer no justification for
ignoring all other moral principles under which SED could have mitigating
value.
In Part II, we review recent work in moral philosophy on the mitigating
significance of SED, which informs our argument that the causal nexus
theory is neither the only nor the most charitable available theory of SED's
mitigating value. We make a brief case for the plausibility of three theories
that regard SED as mitigating without proof of direct and specific causation,
as well as for their popularity among capital jurors.
In Part III, we provide a two-pronged constitutional rationale for
appellate courts to scrutinize lower courts' restrictive consideration of SED
evidence. First, we trace the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on what
constitutes adequate "consideration" of mitigating evidence at trial, arguing
that the thread that unifies the holdings in Lockett, Eddings, and Tennard is
the principle that the moral theories used by a sentencer to consider relevant
17 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -59 (2012); accord FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2001).
The Supreme Court recently struck down the Florida override in part, but the rest survives intact. Hurst v.
Florida, 84 USLW 4032 (2016).
' Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which required
extensive jury involvement in capital sentencing, eight states in addition to Alabama-Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, and Nebraska-gave judges either exclusive
authority to issue a death sentence or final authority with some level of input from the jury. See generally
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515
(West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § xx-xx-x (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (West 2001);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2520 (West 2001).
172 [Vol. 45:1
2018] The Limits of Law in Evaluating Mitigating Evidence
mitigating evidence cannot be subject to legal constraint-whether statutory,
precedential, or a matter of judicial custom. We articulate three factors for
evaluating whether restrictive consideration of deprivation evidence violates
this principle: (i) the court did not even attempt to justify or explain why the
moral theory it used was the appropriate one to rely on, or why alternative
theories were and should be dismissed; (ii) the same court, or other courts in
its jurisdiction, have in the past routinely and without justification used the
same theory-and only that theory-in considering mitigating evidence,
while citing to precedent; and (iii) independent reasons exist for thinking
that a substantial number of reasonable jurors would consider the evidence
broadly mitigating on other moral grounds that the judge did not consider.
Second, we make the case for sentencing judges at both the trial and
appellate level having a unique responsibility to ensure that death sentences
are issued only when they enjoy broad-based communal support.' 9 Applied
to the SED context, this means ensuring that SED evidence is given
unrestricted consideration regardless of the judge's particular moral beliefs.
I. A TROUBLING CASE OF RESTRICTIVE CONSIDERATION: THE
CAUSAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT FOR SED
Nearly all death penalty states require three findings before the issuance
of the death penalty: a finding of "aggravating factors," a finding of
"mitigating factors," and a balancing of aggravating against mitigating
factors based on the "weight" of each.20 The weight of an aggravating or
mitigating factor represents the degree to which it militates in favor of or
against the death penalty. A death sentence is legally justified only if the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones. Rules restricting the
potential weight of relevant mitigating evidence can, therefore, make the
difference between life and death for a defendant, at least in cases involving
few or insignificant aggravating factors. The judicial custom of considering
the mitigating value of SED evidence only on the causal nexus theory,
prevalent in multiple jurisdictions, has been restrictive in precisely this way.
A. The Causal Nexus Requirement in Arizona
As mentioned earlier, the causal nexus theory once functioned as an
exclusionary rule in Arizona. Under the old rule, SED evidence would be
outright excluded from consideration unless the defendant was able to show
that the deprivation "caused" the crime or "had an effect or impact on his
21behavior" at the time of the crime. In practice, the rule demanded proof
" See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181-84 (1976); discussion infra Part III.
20 The current capital sentencing scheme in most states has emerged from the requirements
articulated in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189-96. See also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence
and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. J. 117, 153 (2004) (describing that scheme).
21 See, e.g., Poyson v. Arizona, 743 F.3d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting the Arizona trial
court's statement that "[t]he court finds absolutely nothing in this case to suggest that [the defendant's
commission of the murder] was a result of his childhood"); State v. Phillips, 46 P.3d 1048, 1060 (Ariz.
2002) ("[A]lthough Phillips presented evidence of substance abuse and a difficult childhood, he did not
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that the SED was a specific cause.22 Accordingly, the test set a high bar for
23
admission. Few defendants could offer the required proof, for reasons we
discuss below.24
Once the Supreme Court invalidated a similar exclusionary rule in the
Fifth Circuit, judges switched from "excluding" SED evidence to
"considering" it but assigning "little to no mitigating weight" unless the
defendant could establish the required causal nexus.2 5 The sentencing
procedure was "indistinguishable" in practice "from an analytical 'screen'
that excludes such evidence from consideration as a matter of law. 26In
practice, the results of restrictive consideration and exclusion were the same.
We have found no case in which SED evidence was treated as having "little
or no weight" but in which the defendant was ultimately sentenced to life
imprisonment. 27 Indeed, the evidence suggests that judges who assign SED
offer any evidence that these factors caused him to commit the robberies." (citation omitted)); State v.
Djerf, 959 P.2d 1274, 1289 (Ariz. 1998) ("[D]ifficult family background is not relevant unless the
defendant can establish that his family experience is linked to his criminal behavior." (citation omitted));
State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 795 (Ariz. 1997) ("Defendant did not show any [causal] connection.");
State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 311 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) ("These events, however, occurred when
Defendant was young, years before he robbed and murdered at the age of 27. They do not prove a loss of
impulse control or explain what caused him to kill."); State v. Murray, 906 P.2d 542, 573 (Ariz. 1995)
("[D]ifficult family background is nonmitigating unless defendant can show that something in that
background impacted his behavior in a way beyond his control." (citation omitted)). Some early cases
added that the "effect or impact" had to be "beyond the defendant's control." E.g., State v. Murray, 906
P.2d 542, 573 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Wallace, 773 P.2d 983, 986 (Ariz. 1989). There were (rare)
exceptions. See generally State v. Herrera, 850 P.2d 100 (1993) (life sentence in part because of
"dysfunctional family background"); State v. Rockwell, 775 P.2d 1069 (1989) (life sentence in part
because of SED).
22 Many of the cases suggested that the causal link they sought was at the moment of the crime,
such as an impulse or mental health symptom. See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1022 (2000) (en
bane), supplemented, 65 P.3d 953 (2003) ("Where we determine questions of aggravation and mitigation
in the sentencing process, the significant point in time for causation is the moment at which the criminal
acts are committed. If the defendant's personality disorder or dysfunctional family background leads
reasonable experts to conclude that the disorder in fact caused the crime, significant mitigation is
established."); Mann, 934 P.2d at 795 ("An abusive background is usually given significant weight as a
mitigating factor only when the abuse affected the defendant's behavior at the time of the crime.").
23 In a review of cases since Eddings, we have found only two in which the court applied the causal
nexus test but found the SED sufficiently mitigating to recommend against the death penalty. See
generally State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1989); State v. Bocharski, 189 P.3d 403 (Ariz. 2008).
24 See discussion infra Part II.
25 See, e.g., State v. Prince, 250 P.3d 1145, 1170 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) ("We consider [SED
evidence from the defendant's childhood] in mitigation but give it little weight."); State v. McCray, 183
P.3d 503, 511 (Ariz. 2008) ("A difficult family history is considered in mitigating, but its strength
depends on whether the defendant can show it has a causal connection with the crime." (citation
omitted)).
2 Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1205. See also id. ("Simply altering the label attached to an unconstitutional
process does not magically render it constitutional.").
27 A survey of Arizona capital cases makes clear that mitigating evidence given "little" or "slight"
weight rarely, if ever, results in leniency. See Prince, 250 P.3d at 1170 ("little" weight); State v. Harrod,
183 P.3d 519, 534 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc) ("minimal weight"); McCray, 183 P.3d at 503 ("little weight in
mitigation"); Hoskins, 14 P.3d at 1022 (trial court accorded the SED evidence "slight" weight).
Numerous other cases say that the lack of a causal nexus merely "lessens" the mitigating value of the
SED evidence. While we suspect-and believe that an appellate court could find-that these cases, too,
give little to no mitigating weight to the SED presented, because they do not address other theories under
which the SED could be morally relevant, we do not address them here. See, e.g., State v. Hampton, 140
P.3d 950, 968 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) ("[The defendant's] troubled upbringing is entitled to less weight as
a mitigating circumstance because he has not tied it to his murderous behavior."). Evidence assigned
little to no weight is often excluded from the judge's final list of mitigating factors.
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"little to no" mitigating weight regard it as wholly non-mitigating. 2 8 These
cases are now constitutionally suspect under the ruling in McKinney.29
However, the Ninth Circuit's ruling was narrow: it placed substantial weight
on the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court, despite claiming that it
"considered" the evidence, included a pin cite to an older case that relied on
the unconstitutional exclusionary rule. 30
The nature of the causal nexus demanded by Arizona judges becomes
clearer upon comparing cases in which SED was treated as mitigating with
cases in which it was not. For instance, in the only recent case in Arizona
where SED was given substantial weight, State v. Bocharski, a psychologist
testified that events leading up to the murder triggered symptoms of the
defendant's post-traumatic stress disorder, which stemmed from his
31
childhood trauma. In that case, the defendant had been "severely abused
emotionally, physically, and sexually as a child" and had suffered from
extreme neglect. 32 The court observed that "in assessing the quality and
strength of the mitigation evidence" it looks to the "strength of a causal
connection between the mitigating factors and the crime." 33 It noted as
"evidence of a causal connection" the fact that the psychologist "testified
that Bocharski's troubled upbringing helped cause the murder of [the
victim]." 34 The following facts were cited as supporting that determination:
that the murder occurred immediately after a conversation between the
defendant and the victim about the defendant's childhood abuse; that one
especially traumatizing facet of that abuse involved the malicious killing of
the defendant's childhood pet animals; and that the victim mistreated her
pets. The explanation that elicited a merciful response from the court was
that the defendant's deprivation made him vulnerable to stressful emotions
when confronted with animal mistreatment, and the circumstances leading
up to the murder placed him in a disturbed emotional state in which he was
28 Before affirming a death sentence, Courts routinely attach "little" weight to all of the mitigating
factors-as though to emphasize that the mitigating evidence, even cumulatively, could not be decisive.
See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 189 P.3d 378, 392-93 (Ariz. 2008) (en bane) (state supreme court dismissed
each of the following mitigating factors as having "little" weight: the negative impact of Armstrong's
death sentence on his children, his "troubled and unstable upbringing," his mental health history, and his
"compassionate nature" and then affirmed the death sentence); State v. Murdaugh, 97 P.3d 844, 860
(Ariz. 2004) (en bane) (naming five mitigating factors, all of which the trial court had assigned "little
weight" before imposing the death sentence); State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1168 (Ariz. 2004) (en bane)
("[The trial judge] gave little weight to the [four mitigating factors] ... and concluded that they were
insufficient to call for leniency."). Evidence assigned little to no weight is often excluded from the
judge's final list of mitigating factors. See e.g., Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1210 ("For at the end of its opinion,
the state court listed all of the mitigating circumstances it considered in its independent review of
Poyson's death sentence. It omitted from this critical tally both Poyson's personality disorders and his
abusive childhood.").
29 McKinney, 813 F.3d at 798.
* Id. at 820.
' 189 P.3d 403, 423 (Ariz. 2013) (en bane). Bocharski also mentions that the defendant suffered
problems with alcoholism from a young age, and that he was in an alcoholic state on the day of the
murder that may have made it harder for him to control his actions. Id.
32 Id. at 424-25 (listing childhood hardships that included abandonment; physical abuse and
extreme neglect, including starvation, by his mother; squalid living conditions with little privacy; poverty
that required foraging in garbage cans; exposure to drugs and sex at a young age; and repeated foster
care).
33 Id. at 426 (citing Hampton, 140 P.3d at 968).
34 Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
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less able to "control and manage his feelings and reactions." 35
The Court's reasoning in Bocharski contrasts with its reasoning in a
case decided that same year where SED was given no weight. In State v.
Ellison, the defendant argued that the abuse he suffered as a child
significantly impaired his capacity to make moral choices as an adult. 36 A
psychologist testified that "for a person having experienced Ellison's
upbringing [and] history of physical and sexual abuse . . . , the damage
would carry on into adulthood and potentially destroy the individual."3 7 Yet
the court determined that the defendant's "childhood troubles deserve[d]
little value as a mitigator," given that he had "not provided any specific
evidence that his brain chemistry was actually altered . . . so as to cause or
contribute to his participation in the murders."38 Notably, the court conceded
that the psychiatric testimony made it more than likely "that Ellison did
suffer some mental or emotional damage due to his [SED]." However, it
could not find in this fact any grounds for mitigation. 3 9
The different outcomes in Ellison and Bocharski seem to have turned on
the different types of causal connections that the defendants drew between
their childhood deprivations and their crimes. In Ellison, the nexus was a
fairly general one: the defendant's emotional and mental traits, which were
shaped by the SED, and, it could be inferred, played a role in his resort to
crime. In Bocharski, the causal nexus was specific: the defendant's post-
traumatic stress disorder, which was originally caused by his abuse and
triggered by memories of the abuse at the time of the crime. In other words,
the SED did not shape his moral and decision-making faculties themselves,
but simply, via the PTSD, subverted them at the time of the murder.
Because no such specific and direct causal link between the SED and the
crime could be established in Ellison, the court deemed evidence that the
defendant had suffered from much the same kind of extreme deprivation as
Bocharski to be "not of such a quality or value as to warrant leniency." 40
Similarly, in State v. Prince in 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court
cursorily dismissed evidence of even severer deprivation-that the
defendant's father was "an alcoholic, abusive to his wife and children and
often on the run from law enforcement," and that as a child the defendant
lived in an old barn that lacked adequate heat, running water, a kitchen, or a
bathroom and then as a teenager with an adult male who molested and
sexually abused him 41 -as having "little weight" because the defendant did
not "establish[] a connection between his childhood trauma and the
" Id. at 423.
36 140 P.3d 899 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc).
" Id. at 928.
38 Id. at 927-28 (emphasis added).
39 Cf State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369, 399 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (finding that the defendant's
evidence of sexual abuse, low IQ, frequent moves between schools, and follower-type personality
"do[es] not in any way explain his decision, decades later at age forty-eight, to kill three innocent people
to steal a pickup," as defendant was not mentally retarded and was able to tell right from wrong in
making his own decisions).
40 Ellison, 140 P.3d at 928.
41 State v. Prince, 250 P.3d 1145, 1170 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc).
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murder." 42 A lone citation to Bocharski made clear that the court sought a
causal "connection" of a very immediate sort, such as a mental illness
traceable to the deprivation that prompted the defendant to commit the
crime, or to lose control of his mental faculties. 43
As far as we can tell from these cases, the causal nexus theory Arizona
courts have used in considering SED evidence restrictively is similar to the
causal nexus theory used to review mitigating evidence of mental illness.
Mental illness is generally thought to be mitigating only if it undermines a
defendant's control over her actions at the time of the crime.44 One rationale
for this rule is that defendants who lack control or free will when they
commit crimes are not culpable, and the defendant's culpability is a critical
factor in mitigation. Unfortunately, the opinions in cases like Ellison and
Prince do not explain, in moral and legal terms, why the causal nexus theory
is the only plausible explanation of the mitigating potential of either mental
illness or SED evidence.4 5 We argue in the next section that, at least in the
case of SED, this absence of a justification for restrictive consideration is
troubling because there appear to be many (and more compelling)
alternative explanations for why SED is mitigating.
B. Failure to Justify the Causal Nexus Requirement in Alabama
Alabama courts also frequently give restrictive treatment to SED
evidence, on a similar causal nexus theory, though they are perhaps more
likely to offer an explanation grounded in individual responsibility. No one
who suffers from SED is determined to commit murder, they emphasize.
For instance, in Philips v. State, the trial court rejected the mitigating
value of the repeated violence and neglect suffered by the defendant during
42 Id. at 1170-71.
43 The only circumstance in which courts will infer a nexus is if the SED occurred close in time to
the murder. The rule is that the mitigating value of SED evidence diminishes as time passes between the
deprivation and the murder, entailing that SED seldom serves as a mitigating factor for older defendants.
See, e.g., Prince, 250 P.3d at I170 ("Difficult childhood circumstances also receive less weight as more
time passes between the defendant's childhood and the offense."); State v. McCray, 183 P.3d 503, 511
(Ariz. 2008) (en banc) ("[A] difficult childhood is given less weight when the defendant is older.");
Ellison, 140 P.3d at 927-28 ("His childhood troubles deserve little value as a mitigator for the murders
he committed at age thirty-three."); State v. Hampton, 140 P.3d 950, 968 (Ariz. 2006) ("Hampton was
thirty years old when he committed his crimes, lessening the relevance of his difficult childhood."); State
v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 944 (Ariz. 2006) ("[T]he impact of McGill's upbringing on his choices has
become attenuated during the two decades between his reaching adulthood and committing this
murder."); Anderson, 111 P.3d at 399 ("Anderson's childhood troubles do not in any way explain his
decision, decades later at age forty-eight, to kill three innocent people."). It is clear from State v. Mann
that the court was not looking for just any psychological connection, because a doctor in the case
concluded that the defendant's childhood "directly contributed to Defendant's behavior because he
lacked 'healthy socialization experiences."' 934 P.2d 784, 795 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc).
44 See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1022 (Ariz. 2000) ("Where we determine questions of
aggravation and mitigation in the sentencing process, the significant point in time for causation is the
moment at which the criminal acts are committed. If the defendant's personality disorder or dysfunctional
family background leads reasonable experts to conclude that the disorder in fact caused the crime,
significant mitigation is established.").
45 For instance, the court in Prince stated without explanation that "[d]ifficult childhood
circumstances . . . receive less weight as more time passes between the defendant's childhood and the
offense." Prince, 250 P.3d at 1170.
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his childhood on the basis that it did not directly cause the criminal act.4 6 It
went on to observe: "[t]his Court has heard hundreds if not thousands of
cases of drug abuse, neglect, and domestic violence over the last 20 years,
but Capital Murder does not naturally result . . . from a bad childhood." 47
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.48 Similarly, in Stanley v. State, the
trial court dismissed evidence of a difficult family background as "not
mitigating" because the defendant did not offer any "credible evidence that
any of these factors influenced the commission of the crime." 49 The trial
court emphasized the fact that the defendant's sisters had suffered the same
deprivation but did not become criminals.50 Even more explicitly, the court
in Thompson v. Alabama observed that:
[T]he necessity for every person being morally responsible for his
or her own actions causes these environmental factors which are
offered as mitigation to appear weak . . .. The argument that when a
bad social environment produces bad people, that fact should in
some way mitigate the punishment for these bad people, leads
ultimately to the absurd conclusion that only people who come from
an impeccable social background deserve the death penalty if they
commit capital murder.5 1
The court here also appeared to be laboring under the misimpression that a
disadvantaged background is an automatic grant of leniency, rather than one
sentencing factor to be considered among many.
In the end these courts also treat SED's mitigating potential on this
theory as an all-or-nothing affair: either the extreme deprivation suffered
makes it impossible for the defendant to choose not to commit a criminal act
(perhaps because of a temporary mental inability at the moment of the
crime), in which case SED is mitigating; or the deprivation could be
overcome, in which case it is assigned no mitigating value. Of course,
however, most of the effects of SED can be overcome, so in effect this
reasoning renders SED non-mitigating unless it results in an effect-like a
mental illness-that is generally thought to be less subject to the
individual's control. In short, Alabama courts, too, engage in restrictive
consideration of SED.
Alabama courts see no deficiency in their consideration. The appellate
court that reviewed Stanley, mentioned above, affirmed, arguing that the
sentencing judge adequately "considered all the evidence offered . . .
including [the defendant's] family circumstances [and] background." 52 It
rejected "Stanley's argument . . . that a trial court's failure to find a
46 Phillips v. State, No. CR-12-0197, 2015 WL 9263812, at *83-85 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 18,
2015).
47 Id. at *81
48 Id. at *85.
49 Stanley v. State, 143 So.3d 230, 330-32 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
soId. at 331.
s Thompson v. Alabama, No. CR-05-0073, 2012 WL 520873, at *85 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
s2 Id. at 332.
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mitigating circumstance based on certain mitigating evidence necessarily
means that the trial court did not consider that mitigating evidence."53
Similar cases abound.54
In Alabama, this restrictive consideration of SED has significant
consequences not only for the weighing of evidence at sentencing but in
other areas of criminal law: judges reject ineffective assistance of counsel
claims that are based on counsel's failure to present SED evidence when the
defendant cannot show a causal connection between the SED suffered and
the crime 55 ; and judges reject claims that juries were biased by prosecutorial
suggestion that the SED evidence has no mitigating weight because of lack
of a causal connection.56
C. Other Appearances of the Causal Nexus Requirement
Judges have appealed to the lack of a direct "causal connection"
between SED and criminal conduct to justify giving SED no weight in a
number of other jurisdictions. For instance, in a relatively recent Florida
case, a trial court found that the defendant was emotionally and physically
abused as a child, and yet gave those factors "little weight" because "there
was no connection between Petitioner's alleged childhood emotional and
physical abuse . . . and the murders."57 The causal connection sought was,
once again, a specific one; generally impaired moral and intellectual
capacities due to extreme deprivation did not suffice. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the trial court's treatment of the evidence, arguing that "[a]s long
as the defense is allowed to present all relevant mitigating evidence and the
sentencer is given the opportunity to consider it, there is no constitutional
violation."58 In another case from Florida, the state supreme court suggested
that the defendant's childhood abuse could not have reduced his moral
responsibility because "the defendant's sister, who had also been abused,
" Id. at 331.
54 See, e.g., Davis v. Allen, No. CV 07-S-518-E, 2016 WL 3014784, at *50-51 (N.D. Ala. May 26,
2016) (rejecting defendant's argument that lower court's "failure to give appropriate weight to the
evidence of Davis's childhood abuse because it occurred years earlier than the crime" was
unconstitutional); Thompson v. State, 153 So.3d 84, 189 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) ("While Lockett and its
progeny require consideration of all evidence submitted as mitigation, whether the evidence is actually
[mitigating] is in the discretion of the sentencing authority") (quoting Ex parte Slaton, 680 So. 2d 909,
924 (Ala. 1996)); Waldrop v. State, 987 So.2d 1186, 1202 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (observing that
defendant's counsel did not err in declining to present available SED evidence at sentencing, because the
sentencing judge had "evidence of [a co-defendant's] abusive childhood and stated in his sentencing
order that he afforded it little weight" because "[i]t would be ironic for the courts to determine that
environmental factors which cause people to become violent offenders should then be taken into
consideration to make these people less susceptible to the death penalty").
" See, e.g., Jenkins v. Allen, No. 4:08-cv-00869-VEH, 2016 WL 4540920, at *41 (N.D. Ala. Aug.
31, 2016) ("Any contention that a causal connection exists between the abuse allegedly suffered by
Jenkins and the murder of Tammy Hogeland, is undercut by evidence within Jenkins's own family.").
56 See, e.g., Scheuing v. State, 161 So. 3d 245, 267-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).
" Lynch v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
* Id. at 1339. See also Waldrop v. State, 987 So.2d 1186, 1202 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)
(observing that defendant's counsel did not err in declining to present available SED evidence at
sentencing, because the sentencing judge had "evidence of [a co-defendant's] abusive childhood and
stated in his sentencing order that he afforded it little weight" because "[i]t would be ironic for the courts
to determine that environmental factors which cause people to become violent offenders should then be
taken into consideration to make these people less susceptible to the death penalty").
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including sexually abused by the same alcoholic father, proceeded to live a
normal and productive life."59 As before, SED's mitigating value was seen
to turn on whether it rendered virtually impossible the defendant's ability to
conform his conduct to the law. Because it is difficult to show that SED has
any such effect, it is routinely dismissed when no direct causal connection
between it and the crime is found.6 0
Courts do sometimes dismiss proffered SED evidence on factual
grounds. If the record does not show that the defendant experienced truly
severe deprivation or if it reveals that the defendant was rescued from his
unenviable circumstances fairly quickly and led a relatively normal adult
life after a short period of deprivation, judges reasonably find that the
alleged SED remains unproven.61 We have no quarrel with this practice. Our
concern is exclusively with the narrow scope of the mitigating analysis once
it is recognized that the defendant did in fact suffer from especially severe
neglect, abuse, and/or poverty.
II. UNRESTRICTED CONSIDERATION OF DEPRIVATION EVIDENCE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Recent work in moral philosophy and psychology indicates a renewed
interest in the reasons why severe environmental deprivation mitigates the
punishment a defendant deserves. We briefly review some of this work,
much of which forms a key part of the literature on retributive justice, to
show that causal analysis plays a limited-to-non-existent role in prominent
theories of SED's mitigating force. In addition, we try to show that such
theories that support unrestricted consideration of SED are widely
embraced, including by a great many judges and jurors.6 Both the
5 Douglas v. State, 878 So.2d 1246, 1260 (Fla. 2004).
60 See, e.g., Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 923 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting IAC claim for
failing to investigate mental health and abuse, noting that "no causal connection between the alleged
abuse Callahan suffered as a child and the crime he committed, which were separated by 23 years");
Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled in part by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274 (2004) (evidence of child abuse, alone, without demonstrating any link to the crime, does not
constitute "constitutionally relevant" mitigating evidence); Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir.
1994) (evidence of troubled childhood not constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence when not linked
in any way to the crime); Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Penry
claim where the crime was not attributable to the proffered evidence of troubled childhood); Hines v.
State, 856 N.E.2d 1275, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ("the trial court was not obliged to afford any weight
to [the defendant's] childhood history as a mitigating factor in that [he] never established why his past
victimization led to his current behavior.").
61 See, e.g., State v. Kuhs, 224 P.3d 192, 204 (Ariz. 2010) (defendant grew up in a poverty and was
abused at least once); State v. Kiles, 213 P.3d 174, 191 (Ariz. 2009) (mixed evidence, because some
witnesses testified that Kiles's family life as "ordinary"); State v. Dann, 207 P.3d 604, 628 (Ariz. 2009)
(no evidence of child abuse other than spankings with a belt that his father later viewed as child abuse).
We emphasize, throughout this article, that the environmental deprivation we reference is of an
especially severe sort. The effects of SED we discuss may or may not be fairly inferable from milder
forms of deprivation.
62 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370-71 (2000) (concluding that the defendant's
attorney had fallen "below the range expected of reasonable, professional competent assistance of
counsel" for failing to investigate and present at his sentencing trial "documents prepared in connection
with Williams' commitment when he was 11 years old that dramatically described mistreatment, abuse,
and neglect during his early childhood" and "repeated head injuries"-evidence the Court described as
"significant" mitigating evidence).
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intuitiveness of such theories and their wide appeal will feature critically in
the constitutional arguments we go on to offer in Part III.
A. The Defendant's Diminished Moral Capacities & Culpability
It is not just a scientific platitude but a matter of common sense that the
development of key behavioral capacities is critical to pro-social decision-
making. 6 3 These include emotional capacities, like the capacity to empathize
with others or to form human attachments, and capacities for self-regulation,
including impulse control and anger management. Still others involve basic
executive brain function, such as working memory and the capacity to think
through the consequences of one's actions.64
The development of these capacities, critical as they are to the process
of becoming morally mature, is impaired by severe emotional,
psychological, and sexual abuse. 65 The psychological evidence is extensive,
and often presented at trial by experienced defense counsel in the form of
expert testimony. Childhood abuse or neglect is associated with decreased
levels of empathy and altruism, and increased levels of aggression and
antisocial behaviors, well into adulthood.66 Extreme poverty, too, is
significantly correlated with increased levels of depression, low self-esteem,
and diminished impulse control in children. 67 Darcia Narvaez and Daniel
Lapsley explain that children who have been subject to regular threats,
violence, and deprivation are more likely to develop a "survival-first"
63 Moral capacities are generally seen as being influenced by all three of these elements. See
THOMAS KEENAN & SUBHADRA EVANS, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILD DEVELOPMENT 297-98 (2009).
6 See Tina Malti & Sophia F. Ongley, On Moral Reasoning and Relationship with Moral
Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 166-69, 171-72 (Melanie Killen & Judith
G. Smetana eds., 2d ed. 2014) (reviewing the relationship between moral emotions and moral reasoning,
and the connection between empathy/sympathy and higher levels of other-oriented moral reasoning and
prosocial moral reasoning); Roy F. Baumeister & Julie Juola Exline, Self-Control, Morality, and Human
Strength, 19 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCH. 29 (2000) ("Self-control refers to the selfs ability to alter its
own states and responses, and hence it is both key to adaptive success and central to virtuous behavior,
especially insofar as the latter requires conforming to socially desirable standards instead of pursuing
selfish goals.").
6 Darcia Narvaez & Daniel Lapsley, Becoming a Moral Person-Moral Development and Moral
Character Education as a Result of Social Interactions, in EMPIRICALLY INFORMED ETHICS: MORALITY
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 227 (Markus Christen et. al eds., 2014).
" Id. at 228. See also Joanna Cahall Young & Cathy Spatz Widom, Long-term Effects of Child
Abuse and Neglect on Emotion Processing in Adulthood, 38 CHILD ABUSE NEGLECT 1369 (2014) (the
"effects of childhood abuse/neglect on emotion processing extend until middle adulthood" though it
would be worthwhile to have multiple assessments over time); Michael D. De Bellis & Abigail Zisk, The
Biological Effects of Childhood Trauma, 23 CHILD ADOLESCE. PSYCHIATR. CLIN. N. AN. 2014 185
(2014) ("the data to date strongly suggests that childhood trauma is associated with adverse brain
development in multiple brain regions that negatively impact emotional and behavioral regulation,
motivation, and cognitive function"); Anthony Nazarov et al., Moral Reasoning in Women with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder Related to Childhood Abuse, 7 EUR. J. PSYCHO-TRAUMATOLOGY 2016
(altruism); Paul A. Miller & Nancy Eisenberg, The Relationship of Empathy to Aggressive and
Externalizing/Antisocial Behavior, 103 PSYCH. BULLETIN 324 (1988) (Childhood abuse is associated
with low levels of empathy/sympathy, which are in turn associated with aggression and antisocial,
externalizing behaviors).
6 David T. Takeuchi et al., Economic Distress in the Family and Children's Emotional and
Behavioral Problems, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1031, 1037-39 (1991) (reporting that economic stress
significantly impacts children's emotional and behavioral problems, often resulting in higher levels of
depression, antisocial behavior, and diminished impulse control).
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mindset-a persistent physical and mental state of "high alert"-that
"subverts the more relaxed states that are required for positive prosocial
emotions and sophisticated reasoning."68 When a child's own caregivers are
the source of threats and deprivation, the child can miss crucial
opportunities to develop interpersonal trust and receive affection from
others. These "disruptions and deviations in socialization" can seriously
undermine later attempts to form relationships in adolescence and
adulthood, and are linked to subsequent emotional and behavioral problems
among abused children.69  Studies also show that these factors more
generally limit the development of basic brain functions, including planning
skills, inhibitory control, working memory, cognitive focus, and reward
processing.7 0 The younger the child is at the time of the severe abuse, and
the more sustained the deprivation, the worse and more long-lasting are the
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral effects.71 Each one of these
developmental deficits is individually linked to physical abuse, sexual
abuse, and extreme neglect in childhood, and many capital defendants have
experienced more than one of these deprivations. 7 2
Adults with histories of childhood deprivation and maltreatment are
almost twice as likely to have been incarcerated than those without such
histories, and significantly more likely to have been arrested for a violent
crime.73
6' Narvaez & Lapsley, supra note 65, at 228-29.
69 DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 35-36 (2d ed. 1999).
7o See Nicolas Berthelot et al., Childhood Abuse and Neglect May Induce Deficits in Cognitive
Precursors ofPsychosis in High-Risk Children, 40 J. PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCIENCE 336 (2015) (finding
much lower IQ and poorer cognitive performance in visual episodic memory and in executive functions
of initiation); DeBellis et al., Neuropsychological Findings in Pediatric Maltreatment: Relationship of
PTSD, Dissociative Symptoms, and Abuse/Neglect Indices to Neurocognitive Outcomes, 18 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 171 (2013) (maltreated persons performed significantly lower on IQ, academic
achievement, and nearly all of the tested neurocognitive domains); Kathryn L. Hildyard & David A.
Wolfe, Child Neglect: Developmental Issues and Outcomes, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 679 (2002)
(even neglect alone can have "more severe cognitive and academic deficits, social withdrawal and
limited peer interactions, and internalizing [] problems" than physically abused peers); Roy F.
Baumeister & Julie Juola Exline, Self-Control, Morality, and Human Strength, 19 J. SOC. & CLINICAL
PSYCH. 29 (2000) (neglected children can have difficulties predicting the consequences of their
behavior); William B. Harvey, Homicide Among Black Adults: Life in the Subculture ofExasperation, in
HOMICIDE AMONG BLACK AMERICANS 153 (Damell F. Hawkins ed., 1986) (describing how numerous
social pressures, including a pervasive sense of hopelessness, contribute to high crime rates among
impoverished African American communities within the inner city).
n Raquel A. Cowell et al., Childhood Maltreatment and Its Effect on Neurocognitive Functioning:
Timing and Chronicity Matter, 27 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 521 (2015) (children who suffered
maltreatment as infants or chronically had higher deficits in working memory and inhibitory control); see
also Hildyard & Wolfe, supra note 70, at 679.
72 Gwendolyn M. Lawson et al., Socioeconomic Status and Neurocognitive Development: Executive
Function, in EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN PRESCHOOL AGE CHILDREN: INTEGRATING MEASUREMENT,
NEURODEVELOPMENT AND TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH (J.A. Griffin et al. eds., 2016); Kimberly G.
Noble et al., Socioeconomic Gradients Predict Individual Differences in Neurocognitive Abilities, 10
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 464 (2007).
73 Hyunzee Jung et al., Does Child Maltreatment Predict Adult Crime? Reexamining the Question
in a Prospective Study of Gender Differences, Education, and Marital Status, 30 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 2248 (2015); Izabela Milaniak & Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Abuse and Neglect Increase Risk
for Perpetration of Violence Inside and Outside the Home?, 5 PHYSICAL VIOLENCE 246, 250 (2015);
Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1143, 1154 (1998) (noting the "strong evidence ... that a person who was abused as a child is at
risk of suffering long-term effects that may contribute to his violent behavior as an adult").
182 [Vol. 45:1
2018] The Limits of Law in Evaluating Mitigating Evidence
These facts about the link between childhood deprivation and
psychological development are close to common knowledge in the judicial
system. As Justice Rehnquist observed in Santosky v. Kramer, "[a] stable,
loving homelife is essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual
well-being." 74 Judges also routinely take "judicial notice" of the fact that
extreme neglect and sexual abuse "increases the probability of
[maladjustment and mental] problems."75
Poverty, under-education, and immersion in a culture of violence
similarly distort a person's moral compass even later in life. A number of
theorists have argued that chronic stressors and high levels of psychological
distress due to consistent economic deprivation severely erode "self-esteem
and the sense of mastery, control, and personal efficacy." 76
What is the mitigating upshot of the fact that SED causes such general
impairment in the development of critical moral and behavioral capacities?
Courts who engage in the restrictive consideration of SED assume that
deprivations can only be mitigating if they entirely undercut the defendant's
ability to conform to the law. Accordingly, judges look for evidence that the
SED directly and specifically caused the criminal act. Interestingly, a similar
view informed a seminal article by Judge David Bazelon in the 1970s that
was highly sympathetic towards SED sufferers. Judge Bazelon likened
"mental impairments associated with social, economic, and cultural
deprivation" to mental diseases that undermine the defendant's free will, and
argued that such deprivation provides grounds for excusing the defendant.77
Courts reasonably resisted such arguments, sometimes pointing to socially
well-adjusted siblings of capital defendants, like the Alabama courts cited
above.78 Indeed, none of the studies we have come across suggest that
extreme deprivation destines persons to lead criminal or immoral lives-
which it obviously does not.
But the sentencing question is not whether the defendant should be
74 455 U.S. 745, 788-9 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7' Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 590 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Russell v. Collins, 998
F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that child abuse as "generally understood" would "have
the tendency to affect the child's moral capacity by predisposing him or her toward committing
violence").
76 Mary Keegan Eamon, The Effects of Poverty on Children's Socioemotional Development: An
Ecological Systems Analysis, 46 SOCIAL WORK 257, 258 (2001); see also id. (citing psychological
research on the impact of poverty on moral development); Richard Lipke, Social Deprivation as
Tempting Fate, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 277, 283-84 (2011) (contending social deprivation reduces the
incentives for self-control and may work to stunt its development, thereby reducing the culpability of the
defendant).
n David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 394 (1976). See
also Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background" Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of
Severe Environmental Deprivation? 3 L. & INEQUALITY. 9, 23-34 (1985) (arguing that, in some cases, a
propensity toward crime arising from deprivation is so strong as to render the individual not responsible
for their crimes).
71 See, e.g., Douglas v. State, 878 So.2d 1246, 1260 (Fla. 2004) (noting the diminished mitigating
value of SED evidence where "the defendant's sister, who had also been abused, including sexually
abused by the same alcoholic father, proceeded to live a normal and productive life"). Prosecutors often
also present such evidence to persuade courts. See, e.g., State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 84 (Tenn. 2010)
("The State also presented evidence that Mr. Hester's other siblings, including a sister who had been
sexually abused by her father, had managed to grow up in the same house with the same parents without
having become killers.").
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altogether excused. The question is whether he deserves to be held fully
responsible and maximally punished. Accordingly, while the search for a
causal nexus seems sensible in the context of evaluating questions of guilt
and excuse at the trial stage, it is far from adequate in the context of
mitigation once the defendant has already been convicted. Thus, modem
theorists of SED's moral significance for punishment are less inclined to
treat it as an excuse, and instead regard it in terms of the intuitive notion that
moral responsibility comes in degrees.79 Even a person who could have
chosen to lead a law-abiding life, and is therefore culpable for his wrongful
choices, can, by virtue of the extreme challenges he faced in achieving
moral maturity, be less than fully responsible and/or deserving of less than
maximal punishment.
Arguably the most well-known and influential contemporary moral
philosopher, Thomas Scanlon, articulates the moral intuitions underlying
this theory of "diminished responsibility" as follows. He argues that a
wrongdoer's liability for punishment depends on the adequacy of his
"opportunity to avoid" committing the wrongful act and thus suffering the
associated punishment. A person's opportunity to avoid making a certain
choice "depends on the conditions under which the choice is made: the
quality of information that the person has, the absence of competing
pressures, the attractiveness of the available alternatives, and so on."so In his
discussion of a wealthy individual who compares himself to one living in
poverty, Scanlon contends that the wealthy person's claim that he "chose" to
use his opportunities better than the impoverished person is "weakened by
our supposition that the conditions under which the poor man chose-and
might have chosen differently-did not provide him with adequate
opportunity [to achieve the same results]."8 1 Note that "inadequate
opportunity" is not equivalent to "no opportunity." The diminished
opportunities that SED sufferers have for cultivating their moral capacities
and avoiding punishment under the law, accordingly, limits the extent to
which we can hold such persons responsible for their actions. 82
Judges often appeal to the idea that moral responsibility and culpability
come in degrees. Justice O'Connor opined, concurring in California v.
Brown, that "evidence about the defendant's background and character is
relevant [in mitigation] because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have no such
excuse."83 Writing for the majority a couple of years later in Penry v.
' See D. Justin Coates & Philip Swenson, Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility,
165 PHIL. STUDIES 629 (2013).
'o THOMAS M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 204-05 (2010).
81 id.
82 MANUEL VARGAS, BUILDING BETTER BEINGS: A THEORY OR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 245
(2013) (arguing that the "moral ecology" in which a person comes to make his choices-including
whether or not he has been "trained up" with the resources to respond to moral considerations in the way
we see fit-is relevant to whether or not that person can be thought to be a responsible agent); Lipke,
supra note 75, at 287 (contending social deprivation reduces the incentives for self-control and may work
to stunt its development, thereby reducing the culpability of the defendant).
"3479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Lynaugh, O'Connor confirmed that, "[b]ecause Penry was mentally
retarded .. . and because of his history of childhood abuse," a rational juror
"could conclude that Penry was less morally culpable than defendants who
have no such excuse." 84
Note that on the diminished responsibility theory we are expounding,
extreme deprivation's mitigating weight does not turn on any proof of
immediate or specific causation of any particular crime. It turns on the fact,
inferable from established SED evidence, that the deprivation impaired the
defendant's capacities, which made it generally harder for him to live a law-
abiding and decent life.
Many "death-eligible" jurors-that is, jurors who are not in principle
opposed to the death penalty-are sympathetic to this theory and are less
likely to vote for death because of it. Using data from the Capital Juror
Project, Stephen Garvey finds that of 153 capital jurors interviewed who
were presented with evidence of extreme poverty and "circumstances over
which the defendant had no control [but] that may have helped form (or
misform) his character," roughly 32% were less likely to sentence the
defendant to death.85 If a third of a capital jury refused to issue a death
sentence, in a state where juries rather than judges control the ultimate
sentence, the result would be a life sentence.
B. The Defendant's Suffering & the "Whole Life" View of Retributive
Justice
Even if the defendant emerged from childhood trauma with critical
behavioral capacities largely intact, the suffering inherent in experiencing
severe deprivation can be directly relevant in mitigation. Physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse combined with extreme poverty in childhood
almost always means not just great physical and psychological pain at the
time of the deprivations, but harmful ripple effects throughout a person's
life. As Craig Haney observes, capital defendants have often "confronted
chronic poverty, extraordinary instability, and, for some, almost
unimaginably brutal and destructive mistreatment over which, for most of
their lives, they have been granted little or no control."86 On "whole life"
views of retributive justice, such facts about the overall suffering
experienced by a person over the course of his life are intrinsically relevant
to what punishment the person deserves when he acts wrongfully.
Traditional retributive theories of punishment took a very restricted
view of the times relevant to deciding what a wrongdoer deserves. The key
animating principle behind such theories was, roughly, that the suffering a
wrongdoer inflicts on others must be matched by his equivalent suffering in
the future, regardless of what had already happened to him in the past:
" 492 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
" Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think? 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1565 (1998).
16 Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the
Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 1447, 1565 (1997).
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"[t]hose who perform specific criminal acts deserve specific
punishments ... largely independently of their acts or happiness at other
times." An eye can be taken for an eye, even if the wrongdoer already lost
an eye a long time ago.
By contrast, on what is now called the "whole life approach" or the
"life-cycle" view of retributive justice, what wrongdoers deserve cannot be
decided without considering previous suffering and unhappiness. As Shelly
Kagan, one of the leading proponents of this view, observes, "time drops out
from further consideration: we look at lives as a whole, to see what one
deserves (overall), and whether one has received it (overall)."88 According
to such theorists, the relevant question that the sentencer should be asking in
capital cases is whether the defendant, in light of his criminal conduct and
all of the suffering he has so far endured in his life, deserves so much
additional suffering that he should be executed. The sentencer should treat
the defendant as substantially less deserving of the harshest and ultimate
sentence if the defendant has already experienced incredible suffering in
life, as SED sufferers undoubtedly have. 89
One way of motivating this picture is by appeal to an intuitive principle
(a kind of side-constraint on punishment): there is a limit to the amount of
suffering we should expect any one person to bear in a lifetime. The need to
ensure that no one suffers beyond tolerable levels militates against the
execution of SED sufferers-those who have already suffered enough in
life. The fact that the suffering happened in the past does not make it any
less bad for the person. Defense attorneys routinely appeal to such
considerations and judges give voice to them as well. The Court in Eddings,
for instance, observed that the defendant's terrible family background was
relevant to the sentencing decision, because of its "potential for evoking
sympathy" for the defendant. 90 Arguably, the reason why such facts of
deprivation evoke sympathy is that we recognize a duty to help those who
have suffered too much in life. One way in which we help is by exercising
mercy in sentencing.
As before, the whole life view favors looking beyond the causal nexus
theory when considering SED. It regards SED as mitigating with no causal
analysis. The morally relevant question is simply: how severe and injurious
87 Thomas Hurka, Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in SERENA OLSARETTI, DESERT AND
JUSTICE 45, 52 (2003) (describing the view that he critiques).
" SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 11 (2012) (emphasis added); see also DAVID ROSS,
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 58 (2d ed. 2003).
89 See, e.g., Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705 app. at 749 (1lth Cir. 1988) (describing the
defendant's "impoverished home" as abusive and lacking supervision); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp.
1062, 1065 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (noting that the defendant was repeatedly verbally abused by his chronically
alcoholic father, missed school one-third of the time, was ridiculed because he was slow, and dropped out
in fifth grade; thereafter, he spent most of his time in prisons), vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493
(1Ith Cir. 1992); Phillips v. State, 608 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1992) (stating that the defendant grew up in
poverty and his parents were migrant workers "who often left the children unsupervised"); State v.
Murphy, 605 N.E. 2d 884, 909 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that trial testimony
established that the defendant was raised in "desperate poverty"; had an "unloving, unsupportive, and
abusive family"; lived in a home described as a shack with no hot water or plumbing; lived on public
assistance; and had a father who was an alcoholic).
o California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 548 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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to the defendant was the deprivation suffered? The whole life view of SED's
mitigating significance explains why jurors treat the factor as significantly
mitigating on its own, without any causal connection to the crime or the
defendant's capacities. In a study of juror receptivity to mitigation evidence
based on 400 mock jurors, Mona Lynch and Craig Haney observed that
childhood abuse history and bad family background were regularly treated
as significant in mitigation without any indication of its relationship to the
crime or the defendant's later life.91
C. The Diminished Societal Standing to Punish
We consider one final alternative theory of SED's mitigating value
before turning to the constitutional argument. As before, the focus is not so
much on proving that these theories are correct from the moral point of view
but, rather, on making vivid their plausibility and the unreasonableness of
restrictive consideration based on the causal nexus theory alone.
A number of theorists have articulated SED's moral significance for
criminal justice in terms of the state's "standing to punish." Such theorists
take for granted that society has an obligation to provide a minimally decent
quality of life for all of its citizens.9 2 What constitutes a minimally decent
quality of life is disputed, but it is generally agreed that it involves safety
from physical abuse and access to basic necessities, including food,
clothing, and shelter.93 Accordingly, these theorists argue that our failure to
mitigate extreme poverty and its effects diminishes our standing to punish
those who have suffered from extreme poverty to the maximum extent
allowable by retributive principles.9 4
An individual can lose standing-or moral authority-to hold another
person wholly responsible for a wrongful act, even if the wrongdoer bears
full moral responsibility for the act. This happens when the individual
himself has "unclean hands" with respect to the act. One source of society's
unclean hands when it comes to criminals is its moral failure. to ensure an
adequate safety net that protects everyone from severe environmental
deprivations. As Victor Tadros writes, "[b]y perpetrating distributive
injustice against the poor, we lose standing to hold them responsible for
what they have done." 95 Another reason for the collective's "unclean hands"
concerns the collective's complicity in the wrongdoer's conduct. Tadros
9' Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 337 (2000).
92 See, e.g., Philippe Van Parijs, Why Surfers Should be Fed: the Liberal Case for an Unconditional
Basic Income, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 101 (1991); see also Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About
Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16
NEW CRIM. L. REv. 449 (2013); Daniel Markovitz, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112
YALE L.J. 2291 (2003).
13 See, e.g., HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
(1996); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum Entitlements, 44
MERCER L. REV. 525, 529, 531 (1993) (food, shelter, medical care, housing).
94 For a discussion of this principle, see THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER
256-67 (2000). See also Atiq, supra note 92; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 317 (1973).
9 Victor Tadros, Poverty and Criminal Responsibility, 43 J. VALUE INQUIRY 391, 393 (2009).
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observes:
There are different explanations of how our standing to hold others
responsible may be eroded but two are most important, One is
grounded in hypocrisy: the fact that one person commits the same
kinds of wrong as someone else deprives the one of standing to hold
the other person responsible for his wrongs. The other [reason] is
complicity: the fact that one person participates in the wrong of
someone else deprives the one of standing to hold the other person
responsible for the wrong. A person cannot act as judge when he
ought to be a co-defendant. 96
Tadros views the collective as complicit in the crimes of SED sufferers
because we know-or at least ought to know-that extremely poor
socioeconomic conditions result in crime, and that we have an obligation to
alleviate those conditions. Yet we deliberately choose to invest our
resources in causes other than poverty relief, even at the cost of higher crime
rates. By so choosing, we are complicit in each crime that we could have
prevented had we helped the worst-off. As Tadros put it, "distributive
injustice is criminogenic. In perpetrating distributive injustice, the state
shows itself to have insufficient concern for the victims of crime."97 Such
rationales for limiting how much we punish SED sufferers may be esoteric,
but their logic is compelling.
Judge Bazelon echoes a similar sentiment:
[I]t is simply unjust to place people in dehumanizing social
conditions, to do nothing about those conditions, and then to
command those who suffer, 'Behave-or else!' The overwhelming
majority of violent street crime, which worries us so deeply, is
committed by people at the bottom of the socioeconomic-cultural
ladder . . . . We cannot produce a class of desperate and angry
citizens by closing off, for many years, all means of economic
advancement and personal fulfillment for a sizeable part of the
population, and thereafter expect a crime-free society.98
Bazelon argues that our "unclean hands" are driven not just by our
complicity in the criminal wrongdoing (given its predictability) but also our
failure to give the wrongdoer his due: an adequate social safety net.
How is the collective's diminished standing to punish relevant in
mitigation? Showing mercy at sentencing is one way of recognizing the
9' Id. at 394. See also G.A. Cohen, Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Can't, Condemn the
Terrorists?, 81 ROYAL INST. OF PHIL. SUPPS. (2006).
9 For a defense of the two premises that poverty is criminogenic and that the collective has a
responsibility to alleviate criminogenic conditions, see Tadros, supra note 94 (arguing that "the state [is]
complicit in the crimes of the poor" and thus the poor have a moral claim "for the state to refrain from
holding them responsible for their crimes, even if they are in fact responsible for them, which involves
diminished blame").
9' Bazelon, supra note 77, at 401-02.
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collective's diminished standing to punish. The reasons for exercising
mercy, again, do not turn on the causal connectedness between the
deprivation suffered and the crime. While the standing view is less
obviously embraced by jurors, it is a common strategy of defense counsel to
portray the defendant as a "victim" of societal ills. We have found at least
one attorney and psychologist, Deena Logan, who concludes, based on an
analysis of 31 closing arguments at death sentencing trials, that effective
characterization of the defendant as a victim by appeal to his poverty,
diminished mental capacity, and deprived social background elicits mercy
from juries. 99
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST RESTRICTIVE
CONSIDERATION OF DEPRIVATION EVIDENCE
In this section, we argue that restrictive consideration of SED evidence
warrants constitutional scrutiny. While it is often assumed that judges'
weighing of mitigating factors is unreviewable, two strands of constitutional
doctrine suggest otherwise. The first is found in a long line of cases
identifying certain constraints on the "consideration" of mitigating evidence
as unconstitutional. 0 0 The second is evident in the Court's refrain that the
death penalty must not be issued unless it enjoys broad-based community
approval. Our elaborations of these two lines of precedent, in combination
with the evidence discussed in the previous section of the intuitiveness and
broad-based appeal of the moral theories on which SED has mitigating
weight absent a causal nexus with the crime, offer grounds for scrutinizing
and invalidating restrictive consideration of deprivation evidence.
A. "Consideration" Requires a "Reasoned Moral Response," Not
Legal Formalism
It is a bedrock principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that a
death sentence must be based on "individualized consideration" of any
mitigating circumstances.'o The case establishing the principle, Lockett v.
Ohio, found that a statute prohibiting capital juries from taking into account
any mitigating factors other than three specifically mentioned violated the
individualized consideration requirement. 102 We think the holding rests on a
more general principle, which we defend below: that individualized moral
consideration of mitigating factors requires that the sentencer's reasoning
not be cabined by artificial legal constraints. The Court has spent three
decades elaborating what counts as a legal constraint. preventing
9 Deana Logan, Pleading for Life: An Analysis of Themes in 21 Penalty Arguments by Defense
Counsel in Recent Capital Cases, 4 CAL. DEATH PENALTY DEF. MANUAL 2SN-19 (1982); see also
Deana Logan, Why This Man Deserves to Die: Themes Identified in Prosecution Arguments in Recent
Capital Cases (1983) (unpublished manuscript).
'00 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
'0o Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (sentencers must "treat each defendant in a capital
case with the degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual").
102 Id. at 593-94.
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individualized consideration, and SED evidence has played a central role in
its elaboration.
Ten years after Lockett, the Court prohibited not just statutory
limitations on what mitigating factors can be considered, but judge-made
rules limiting the conditions under which a mitigating factor can be
considered. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the trial judge ignored evidence
offered by the defendant of his youth and turbulent family history, stating
that he could not "in following the law" consider such evidence unless it
"tended to provide a legal excuse from criminal responsibility." 10 3 The court
of criminal appeals affirmed the resulting death sentence. The Supreme
Court expressed some uncertainty as to which law the trial judge was
referring to. But he seemed to be alluding to a M'Naghten-style test for legal
insanity, which gives the defendant a full defense if he lacked the capacity
to know "the difference between right and wrong."l 04 No Oklahoma statute
at the time required sentencers to use the insanity defense standard in
evaluating mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase of a trial.105
The Supreme Court concluded that, by excluding relevant mitigating
evidence from consideration out of a sense-correctly or incorrectly-that
the law requires it, the trial court and the highest state court had violated
Lockett. As the Court explained, a judge has discretion to assign weight to a
mitigating factor, but "may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence
from their consideration."l 06
The Court further clarified the Eddings rule in a later case, Tennard v.
Dretke, which held that judicial precedent-like a statute or a vague sense of
what the law demands-cannot cabin a sentencing agent's "consideration"
of mitigating evidence.1 07 Again, the case involved SED evidence. Tennard
reviewed the Fifth Circuit's use of a "constitutional relevance" test in
determining whether to grant certificates of appealability for Penry claims-
defendants' claims that jury instructions at sentencing improperly reduced
the effect of their mitigating evidence.108 The Fifth Circuit's test required
that the evidence in question represent a "uniquely severe permanent
handicap" that bears a "nexus" to the crime. 109 The Fifth Circuit refused to
grant a certificate in Tennard's case on the grounds that his evidence of a
low IQ and childhood abuse failed the test. The Supreme Court held that the
court of appeals was wrong to condition its review on whether the
mitigating evidence met a judge-made legal standard.o10
03 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113.
'MId. at 109.
os Id. at 118. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited to an earlier decision, Gonzales v. State, for
the test of criminal responsibility in the state, its use of the test as a means for weighing mitigating
evidence was a judicial innovation. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (1980) (citing Gonzales v.
State, 388 P.2d 312 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964)).
1o6 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
"7 Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) [hereinafter Penryll].
' Tennard, 542 U.S. at 274.
"0 We actually think that Smith and Tennard are best understood as applications of Eddings, though
the Court did not discuss them that way. Why didn't the Court come out and explain that more directly?
Because the Fifth Circuit was not in the business of weighing mitigating evidence; that task was left for
the jury. The court of appeals was merely reviewing whether the SED evidence was relevant in order to
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Eddings and Tennard indicate that judges cannot limit their own moral
consideration of relevant mitigating evidence out of a sense that the law-
whether statute or judicial precedent-requires it. These cases are a logical
application of the Lockett holding that capital sentencing requires
individualized consideration of mitigating factors. Implicit in these cases is
an important general principle that has yet to be fully articulated: that a
judge's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence is unconstitutionally
narrow when it involves assessing the evidence relative to a limited set of
moral principles out of a sense that legal rules demand it (where 'it' refers to
the limitation on the moral principles by which the evidence is judged). We
do not intend to offer an analysis here of what it means to follow a rule or
practice because it is the law. But it is easy to identify paradigmatic cases of
legalism or legal rule following. For example, a judge might follow a rule
out of a sense that it is binding precedent or because other judges have an
informal convention of following the norm. When restricted consideration
of mitigating evidence is the result of judges imposing restrictions
legalistically, this violates the principle implicit in the Lockett line of cases.
The key to our interpretation is that the individualization principle of
Lockett has its roots in the distinction between moral reasoning and legal
reasoning. In Lockett, Eddings, Tennard, and Smith, the Court did not decide
in an ad hoc way that particular sorts of legal rules may not constrain the
capital sentencer's moral consideration of mitigating evidence. The Court
was concerned with eliciting moral consideration from -sentencers by
removing legal constraints on their ability to consider the evidence from a
purely moral point of view. This is why the Court has emphasized time and
again that a capital sentence must reflect a "reasoned moral response to the
defendant's background, character, and crime.""' The Court itself has
acknowledged that the "reasoned moral response" principle "first
originated" in Lockett and Eddings.112 As Justice Stevens once wrote, "in the
final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical
judgment-an assessment of . .. the moral guilt of the defendant."1 13 In a
precursor case to Lockett, the Court explained that capital sentencing
requires "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the record of
each convicted defendant" lest defendants be treated as a "faceless,
decide whether it should hear the case.
.. Penry II, 532 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted).
112 Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) ("[W]e have long recognized that a sentencing
jury must be able to give a 'reasoned moral response' to a defendant's mitigating evidence-particularly
that evidence which tends to diminish his culpability-when deciding whether to sentence him to
death. This principle first originated in Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma, in which we held that
sentencing juries in capital cases "must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor."); see
also Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007) ("Our cases following Lockett have made
clear that when the jury is not permitted to give meaningful effect or a 'reasoned moral response' to a
defendant's mitigating evidence . . . the sentencing process is fatally flawed.").
"' Spaziano v. Florida, 465 U.S. 447, 469 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (outlining the capital jury's task of
expressing "the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death"); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1976) (reflecting on the importance on the moral views of society
in the administration of death penalty); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20 (1968) ("[A] jury
that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.").
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undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death."' 14
In McKinney v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit appears to have implicitly relied
on something like this insight in finding unconstitutional the longstanding
practice among Arizona judges of considering a defendant's SED to have
appreciable mitigating value only if it "caused" his crime.' '5 As explained in
Part I, judges who engaged in this practice did not view themselves as
following binding judicial precedent, as they did when they relied on the old
exclusionary rule invalidated by Tennard. Rather, they appeared to be
following an informal custom amongst judges who had previously applied
the exclusionary rule. Judicial customs can, of course, give rise to informal
norms and rules that judges follow out of habit or a sense of their legality
and the obligations of the judicial office. The practice of giving SED
effectively no weight absent a causal nexus bore all the earmarks of such a
judicial custom The court of appeals deemed the practice unconstitutional
under Eddings. Unfortunately, McKinney's decision remains unnecessarily
localized, given the en banc court's decision to focus not on the existence of
an entrenched judicial practice of restricted consideration but on the
practice's historical link to the old exclusionary rule.116 As previously
mentioned, the court emphasized the Arizona Supreme Court's pin citation
to the old rule.1 7 Because of this choice of emphasis, the Ninth Circuit
missed an opportunity to articulate a general test for identifying when the
improper influence of a legal practice or custom makes a court's
consideration of evidence inadequate under Eddings.
We offer a three-factor test for this purpose, drawn from cases-such as
those reviewed in Arizona and Alabama-in which an entrenched judicial
practice clearly seems to have induced restrictive consideration of relevant
evidence. Appellate courts have grounds for finding an Eddings violation
when all three of the following facts concerning a lower court's sentencing
analysis obtain: (i) the court did not even attempt to justify or explain why
restrictive treatment of the mitigating evidence was morally appropriate, or
why alternative theories of the moral significance of the evidence should be
rejected; (ii) the same court, or other courts in its jurisdiction, have in the
past routinely appraised the evidence according to the same circumscribed
set of moral principles while citing to prior precedent; (iii) independent
reasons exist for thinking that a substantial number of reasonable jurors
would consider the evidence mitigating based on principles that the court
did not even consider. The combination of these factors suggest that the
court did not engage in a careful, individualized moral assessment of the
mitigating evidence, but instead simply followed an entrenched legal
practice or custom. The first factor suggests an absence of moral analysis;
the second indicates that the court was following a legal convention; and the
third factor indicates that if the court had considered alternative, widely
114 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
... McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015).
"
6 Id. at 813-18.
7 Id. at 814.
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endorsed moral principles, then it would have reached a different conclusion
about the evidence's mitigating value.
Of course, other factors might supplement an appellate court's review.
For instance, it would undoubtedly be relevant if, as is in Arizona, a statute
or precedent had previously demanded the same limited consideration." 8
The Arizona Supreme Court had, before Tennard, interchangeably described
SED evidence lacking the requisite causal connection as "irrelevant" and as
having "little to no weight," and switched to exclusive use of the weighing
language only after Tennard." 9 This suggests that the court saw the outright
exclusion of SED evidence from consideration and the denial of weight to it
after restrictive consideration as equivalent.
Our test applied in the SED context suggests that restrictive
consideration of SED evidence by judges is frequently unconstitutional. To
approach the analysis in reverse, consider the third factor. We offered
arguments in Part II in support of the notion that SED evidence is mitigating
irrespective of its exact causal relationship with the crime-arguments
concerning the defendant's moral capacities and culpability, the defendant's
prior suffering, and the state's moral standing to punish. We also referred to
studies demonstrating that a substantial number of jurors tend to treat SED
evidence as inherently mitigating.120
Now consider the first and second factors. We have struggled to find
instances-in any American jurisdiction-where a court made a serious
attempt to explain why from the moral point of view SED can only be
mitigating if the causal nexus with the crime obtains, as discussed in Part I.
Indeed, the opinions we have reviewed rarely if ever provide any rationale
for the limitation. Instead, courts tend to cite earlier cases where a judge
relied on restrictive consideration-and not as persuasive authorities,
because the cited cases rarely include an explanation of the moral grounds
of the causal nexus requirement.
In the rare instances in which judges attempt to critique alternative
approaches to SED evidence, they critique caricatures of them. For instance,
in one case the Alabama state court of criminal appeals stated that "[t]he
argument that when a bad social environment produces bad people, that fact
should in some way mitigate the punishment for these bad people, leads
ultimately to the absurd conclusion that only people who come from an
impeccable social background deserve the death penalty if they commit
capital murder."'21 We are unaware of any judge or scholar who has argued
either that mild deprivations are mitigating, or that even severe deprivations
. State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1022 (Ariz. 2003).
." The Ninth Circuit has expressed some confusion about the Arizona Supreme Court's application
of the causal nexus exclusion rule, stating that "Arizona's case law in this regard is conflicting," and
citing interchanging examples of the state supreme court saying that it was either (a) considering
evidence without a causal nexus but giving it no weight or (b) altogether refusing to consider such
evidence. Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 946 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198,
1200 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that "Arizona has a checkered past" with respect to using the causal nexus
test as a clearly illegal screening mechanism and as a weighing mechanism). This mixed record might be
explained if the state court saw no difference between the two rules.
20 See discussion infra Part II.
121 Thompson v. Alabama, No. CR-05-0073, 2012 WL 520873, at *85 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
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automatically disqualify a defendant from receiving the death penalty.122
Certainly the arguments we consider in Part II do not have either of these
implications. In another case, the Florida Supreme Court suggested that the
defendant's childhood abuse could not have reduced his moral responsibility
because "the defendant's sister, who had also been abused, including
sexually abused by the same alcoholic father, proceeded to live a normal and
productive life."1 23 But on most theories of SED's mitigating value, as
discussed in Part II, the deprivation need not determine a person's wrongful
acts in order to diminish his punishment-worthiness.
Admittedly, the application of Eddings to the practice of restrictive
consideration of SED evidence is imperfect, a point that the dissent in
McKinney was eager to emphasize. 124 The court of appeals in Eddings
explicitly stated that it was using the "legal test of criminal responsibility" to
exclude the SED evidence as "non-mitigating." By contrast, courts that give
restrictive consideration to SED's mitigating value do not claim to be
"following the law," and they tend to give SED "little to no" mitigating
weight rather than none at all. As we explained above, however, we think
that Eddings rests on a broader principle: that a sentencing judge should not
limit their moral evaluation of mitigating evidence based on any legal
custom or authority, even if the custom is never expressly acknowledged or
even recognized by the judge. A test for SED's mitigating value that is
applied in customary fashion, one that drastically and counter-intuitively
limits the deprivation's mitigating weight, is inconsistent with such a
principle.
Moreover, as explained in Part I, in jurisdictions that favor restrictive
treatment, "little to no" mitigating weight is equivalent, at least in effect, to
excluding the evidence outright. A survey of Arizona capital cases, for
example, makes clear that mitigating evidence given "little" or "slight"
weight rarely, if ever, results in leniency.125 Before pronouncing a death
sentence, courts often cursorily attach "little" weight to all of the mitigating
factors in the case-indicating both that the "little" modifier is meant as a
dismissal, and that mitigating factors of "little" weight do not warrant a
lighter sentence even when considered in aggregate.'26 In other cases,
mitigating evidence assigned little to no weight is so far from the sentencing
judge's mind that it is excluded from her final list of mitigating factors.1 27
Accordingly, appellate courts have sound basis to find a failure to
"consider" SED evidence under Eddings whenever lower courts routinely
rely on restrictive consideration of deprivation evidence without explanation
or defense, especially in light of the strong reasons for thinking that SED is
122 Of course, mere humanity might be thought to be automatic disqualification-but this would
apply to all persons and not just SED sufferers.
123 Douglas v. State, 878 So.2d 1246, 1260 (Fla. 2004).
124 McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting).
125 See supra note 27.
126 See supra note 28.
127 See, e.g., Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1210 (9th Cir. 2013) ("For at the end of its opinion,
the state court listed all of the mitigating circumstances it considered in its independent review of
Poyson's death sentence. It omitted from this critical tally both Poyson's personality disorders and his
abusive childhood.").
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mitigating in the absence of any causal connection with the crime.
Restrictive consideration may pass constitutional muster when a sentencing
judge offers some explanation or justification for taking a markedly limited
view of SED's mitigating value, and there are indications that the judge is
engaging in independent moral analysis. In general, however, restrictive
consideration of SED evidence in the jurisdictions we have studied appears
to be the product of an entrenched judicial practice or custom that has
artificially cabined the individualized moral inquiry that Lockett and its
progeny demand.
B. Communal Endorsement & the Constitutional Importance of
Evaluating Mitigating Evidence Under a Range of Reasonable
Moral Principles
Judges could simply consider SED's mitigating value on the basis of a
variety of different moral perspectives and principles. For example, instead
of considering whether SED is mitigating based on the impaired
capacities/responsibility theory alone, they might also consider it's
mitigating weight on the basis of the whole-life view of retributive justice.
This would obviate the need to justify a restrictive view of SED's mitigating
value in the sentencing decision. More importantly, it would be consistent
with a line of Supreme Court precedent since Gregg, emphasizing that the
death penalty depends for its constitutional legitimacy on its link with
community values.128
Whereas our argument above emphasized the constitutionally suspect
nature of the practice of taking a restrictive view of SED's mitigating weight
for granted and without explanation, here we argue that judges may be
constitutionally obliged to give unrestricted consideration to SED evidence:
that is, consideration based on a number of different moral principles that
are sufficiently plausible. Unrestricted consideration is inclusive: it
incorporates a diversity of perspectives on the mitigating potential of SED;
and sole-sentencing judges have a special responsibility to ensure that the
defendant is sentenced to death only if such a penalty would enjoy broad-
based communal support.
The importance of broad-based communal support to the
128 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (outlining the capital jury's "task of
express[ing] the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death" (citation
omitted)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.30 (1976) ("Punishment is the way in which society
expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that
the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great
majority of citizens for them."(citation omitted)); id. at 181 (reflecting on the importance of maintaining
a link between contemporary community values and the penal system (citation omitted)); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1976) (reflecting on the importance on the moral views of society
to the administration of death sentences (citation omitted)); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975) (noting that the capital sentencing jury as a representative of a criminal defendant's community
provides him with "diffused impartiality" (citation omitted)); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519
(1968) (describing the sentencer's task as that of "express[ing] the conscience of the community on the
ultimate question of life or death"). See also Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79, 144-45 n.232 (2002) (reciting evidence that the "the case law as a whole
indicates that communal values must play a role in capital sentencing").
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constitutionality of capital sentencing schemes is well established. The death
penalty must be tested against the "conscience of the community,"l 29 and
"one of the most important functions" of the sentencing agent in a capital
trial is to "maintain a link between community values and the penal
system."'30 It is, indeed, no coincidence that the constitutionality of the
death penalty, in light of the Eighth Amendment's familiar prohibition
against "cruel and unusual" punishments,131 turns on the contemporary
moral values of the public. The Amendment "draw[s] its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"l 32 and in the past fifteen years alone, the Supreme Court has held
that capital punishment is unconstitutional for the mentally handicapped,1 3 3
for minors,134 and for crimes other than murder and treason 35-all to bring
our sentencing practices into alignment with the evolving moral standards of
the citizenry. The fact that the death penalty is ever on the verge of being
cruel and unusual by contemporary standards underscores the fact that
capital sentencing depends for its ongoing legitimacy on the people's
approval. 3 6
The importance of broad moral approval is also apparent in the near-
universal state legislative preference for jury-based capital sentencing. Even
before a Supreme Court ruling in the last decade constitutionally mandated
jury participation in capital sentencing, 33 of 38 death penalty states already
required it.' 37 In 27 of the current 31 death penalty states, the jury's decision
to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment is final and cannot be
129 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 ("[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital
punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death."). See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (a death sentence "is ultimately understood as an expression of the
community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement to live"); id at 483
("But more important than its procedural aspects, the life-or-death decision in capital cases depends on
its link to community values for its moral and constitutional legitimacy.").
13 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 ("[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in
making . . . a selection (between life imprisonment and death for a defendant convicted in a capital case)
is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system." (citation omitted)).
... U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
132 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citation omitted). See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419
(2008); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 274-79 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 382-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id
at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 429-30 (Powell, J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion).
"3 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abolishing the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
134 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for individuals under the
age of eighteen at the time of their capital crimes).
1 Kennedy 554 U.S. at 407 (abolishing the death penalty for rape where the death of the victim
was neither the result nor the intent).
1 6 While it is not our concern in this article to defend this conception of capital sentencing, we take
the rationale to be fairly obvious. The state, acting on society's behalf, needs to earn its moral approval
before it inflicts such a grave harm on a person as death; in a pluralistic society, this means ensuring that
a death sentence has been tested against as many of the dominant moral views of a community as
possible.
... Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), requires that juries find all aggravating factors in death
penalty cases, so juries must be involved at least to that extent. The only state in which the jury continues
to be formally uninvolved in capital sentencing is Montana, which issued its last death sentence in 1996,
prior to Ring. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2013). Even before Ring, only four other states-
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Nebraska-used exclusively judicial capital sentencing.
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overridden by a trial judge.' 8 The case law and academic commentary
explain this legislative preference in terms of the jury's perceived status as
an especially reliable indicator of the "conscience of the community." 39 The
twelve-person capital sentencing jury is selected to approximate a random
cross-section of the community, one believed to be significantly more likely
than a sole sentencing judge to bring a diversity of moral perspectives to
bear on the sentencing decision.1 40 The jury's unanimity-required for the
imposition of the death penalty in every state save Florida and Alabama 41
makes even likelier that each death sentence will enjoy widespread public
support. Evidence that would mitigate the defendant's punishment-
worthiness in the eyes of a substantial portion of the community is less
likely to be overlooked by multiple jurors than by a judge acting as the sole
sentencer-or so the advocates of jury sentencing argue.142
Until recently, two states allowed trial judges to independently issue
death sentences, even when it meant overriding a jury's recommendation of
life imprisonment. Yet even while doing so, Florida gave privileged status to
the jury verdict, because of the jury's ability to represent communal
sentiment. In that state, the trial judge could not impose death over a jury's
recommendation of life unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death
'" Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 407 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The only states
in which jury decisions are not final are Delaware, where only one jury life sentence has been overridden
in favor of death, and that was overturned by the state supreme court; and Indiana, where the judge may
decide the sentence if the jury cannot reach a unanimous sentence, 2002 Ind. Acts 1734.
"9 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) ("[the jury] . . . is a significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values") (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 596 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976))); id. (noting the jury's function
of "maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the penal system"(citation
omitted)); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (arguing that juries preserve the essential link between capital punishment
and communal values). See also Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven ": Mercy in
Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1003 n.56 (1996) ("Capital sentencing juries are said to
represent the 'conscience of the community.' However, they 'represent' the community only because
they are members of the community, not because they discern and then apply community standards.");
Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L REv. 1, 101-19 (1980) (arguing that the jury, as
representative of the community, is more likely to accurately measure the offense against community
outrage); Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death
Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 48 (1986) (arguing that "the requirement that a
capital sentencing jury consist of twelve persons as compared with a solitary person acting as judge also
contributes to the prospect that a cross section of the community will be making the sentencing
decision").
140 Id. Of course, a single jury may not fully reflect dominant community sentiment insofar as voir
dire challenges can skew a jury's cross-sectional character. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102
(1970) ("Even the 12-man jury cannot insure representation of every distinct voice in the community,
particularly given the use of the peremptory challenge."); Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death
Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786, 798 (1983) ("[W]hile the jury role is essential to ensure
expression of present and developing community sentiment there is a risk that individual juries may not
reflect that sentiment.").
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) ("Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury,
the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life
imprisonment or death.").
142 See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1978) (surveying the empirical data and
concluding that a greater number of decision makers increases the likelihood of approximating "the
common sense of the community," and that "the smaller the group, the less likely it is to overcome the
biases of its members to obtain an accurate result" (citation omitted)). See also SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A
LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY 125 (2005) (describing the difference
in moral perspectives of pro-life vs. pro-death jurors).
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[were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ."l43 Florida's specific override provision was overturned in 2016 as a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to have all critical findings
necessary to impose the death penalty decided by jury, because the jury in
Florida issued no factual findings with its recommended verdict.1 44
Although the Supreme Court has previously approved Alabama's judicial
override, which did not require deference to the jury but did require the jury
to find aggravating factors, doubts about the constitutionality of the practice
linger. Earlier this year, the Alabama governor signed legislation banning
the override for defendants convicted after April 11th. 145 The constitutional
question is not entirely moot, however, because Florida may still rewrite its
judicial override scheme and the recent Alabama legislation left the 183
inmates already on the state's death row unaffected.1 46
One of the central doubts animating resistance to judge-determined
death sentences regards the trial judge's capacity to adequately embody the
"conscience of the community" in sentencing. 147 Justice Stevens, dissenting
in Harris, where the majority approved Alabama's capital sentencing
scheme, observed that, "an unfettered judicial override of a jury verdict for
life imprisonment cannot be taken to represent the judgment of the
community. A penalty that fails to reflect the community's judgment that
death is the appropriate sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under our reasoning in Gregg."l48 His dissent argued that:
"4 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The Supreme Court recently, in Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016), invalided an iteration of Florida's override because it allowed the judge to
override the jury not just on the overall weight of the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors
but on the initial finding of aggravating/mitigating factors as well.
144 Hurst, 136 S.Ct. at 624 (2016).
145 "Alabama Ends Death Penalty by Judicial Override," Associated Press (Apr. 11,
2017),https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2017-04-11/alabama-ends-death-
penaltv-by-judicial-override; Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995). See also Brooks v. Alabama,
2016 WL 266239, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) ("This Court's
opinion upholding Alabama's capital sentencing scheme was based on Hildwin v. Florida, and Spaziano
v. Florida, two decisions we recently overruled in Hurst v. Florida.").
146 "Alabama Ends Death Penalty by Judicial Override," Associated Press, Apr. 11, 2017,
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2017-04-11 /alabama-ends-death-penalty-by-
iudicial-override.
147 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). See also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 253 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("In our criminal courts the jury sits as the representative of the
community. Its voice is that of the society against which the crime was committed. A judge, even though
vested with statutory authority to do so, should hesitate indeed to increase the severity of such a
community expression."); Scott E. Erlich, The Jury Override: A Blend ofPolitics and Death, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 1403, 1431 (1996) (noting that a judicial override is problematic because "it tends to dilute the
community's voice as represented by the collegial body-the jury"); id. at 1434 ("[Tlhis deficiency has
created a situation in which the conscience of the community-the jury has been all but removed from
Alabama's capital sentencing process."); Stephen Gillers, The Quality ofMercy: Constitutional Accuracy
at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1037 (1985) (arguing that the
constitutional law demands a sentencing body that has competency to decide the death question fairly);
Shannon Heery, If It's Constitutional, Then What's the Problem?: The Use of Judicial Override in
Alabama Death Sentencing, 34 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 347, 392 (2010) (noting the jury's role to
represent the community); Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of
Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 47 (1986) ("Given that the
purpose of a death sentence is to reflect community standards, judges should be denied the power of the
override unless or until we are willing to evaluate prospective judges as to their propensity to embody
communal consciousness.") .
"14 Harris v. Alabama, 513.U.S. 504, 525 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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[T]he men and women of the jury may be regarded as a microcosm
of the community, who will reflect the changing attitudes of society
as a whole to the infliction of capital punishment, and that there
could therefore be no more appropriate body to decide whether the
fellow-citizen whom they have found guilty of murder should ...
[die] or receive a lesser punishment. 149
More recently, Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the Court's decision
not to hear a case that would have provided an occasion to reconsider the
constitutionality of Alabama's judicial override, observed that, "[b]y
permitting a single trial judge's view to displace that of a jury representing a
cross-section of the community, Alabama's sentencing scheme has led to
curious and potentially arbitrary outcomes."150 Notably, these justices
perceived a tension between the majority's tolerance for judicial overrides in
Harris and the Court's earlier precedent, in cases like Gregg, emphasizing
the need for death sentences to be issued only if they would enjoy broad-
based communal support.1
Setting aside the question of the constitutionality of judge sentencing in
the capital context, we think that, at the very least, the importance of
ensuring broad-based communal support for the death penalty militates
strongly in favor of unrestricted consideration of deprivation evidence
whenever the judge is the sole sentencer, precisely because such
consideration involves assessing the evidence based on a diverse range of
moral perspectives on SED's mitigating value. In fact, we think our
argument generalizes to all mitigating evidence: judges should embrace
unrestricted analysis whenever they and not the jury decide the death
penalty. The consistency of the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence would be well served by a more explicit acknowledgment of
this fact.
The sole sentencing judge does not enjoy the benefits of multiple voices
participating in the sentencing process. If she brings only her own private
moral beliefs to bear on the sentencing decision, the likelihood becomes
high that any death sentence she issues will reflect only her private, as
opposed to a communal, moral response. To guard against that risk, the
sentencing judge, unlike the individual juror, needs to take seriously moral
principles endorsed by her fellow citizens that assign significant weight to
149 Id. at 517 (quoting Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, Report 200 (1953)). .
'so Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 409-10 (2013 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)) ("For
example, Alabama judges frequently override jury life-without-parole verdicts even in cases where the
jury was unanimous in that verdict. In many cases, judges have done so without offering a meaningful
explanation for the decision to disregard the jury's verdict. In sentencing a defendant with an IQ of 65,
for example, one judge concluded that "[t]he sociological literature suggests Gypsies intentionally test
low on standard IQ tests." Another judge, who was facing reelection at the time he sentenced a 19-year-
old defendant, refused to consider certain mitigating circumstances found by the jury, which had voted to
recommend a life-without-parole sentence. He explained his sensitivity to public perception as follows:
"'If I had not imposed the death sentence, I would have sentenced three black people to death and no
white people. "'(citations omitted)).
's' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15).
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relevant mitigating evidence that she may not ultimately be persuaded by.1 5 2
If some factor would be deemed, for plausible reasons, to be substantially
mitigating by a significant number of reasonable judges and jurors, the
sentencing judge should regard it as such even if she is ultimately
unconvinced of its mitigating worth.153
Accordingly, sole sentencing judges should embrace unrestricted
consideration of SED evidence. Unrestricted consideration incorporates the
view that SED is mitigating when it impairs the defendant's ability to
control his conduct and thereby limits his culpability. It recognizes the life-
cycle view of retributive justice and the constraints on inflicting excessive
suffering on persons who have led miserable lives. It considers the state's
diminished standing to punish individuals who have been left behind. In
other words, unrestricted consideration involves recognizing SED's
substantial mitigating significance in the absence of demonstrable causal
connections with the crime, and thereby ensures that serious deprivation has
the effect at sentencing that it would have had it been considered by a
representative collection of members of the community. As discussed in Part
II, the treatment of SED as inherently mitigating is based on moral
considerations that are substantively reasonable and enjoy wide-appeal. If
one of the most important functions that the sentencer can serve in capital
cases is ensuring that the death penalty is only issued if would enjoy broad-
based communal support, sole sentencing judges should embrace
unrestricted consideration of SED's mitigating value (and of mitigating
evidence more generally).'15 4
152 In other words, the judge, as sentencer, needs to be a more self-conscious representative of
public morality than the individual juror in a twelve-person jury. Feminist approaches to the role and
responsibilities of the judge have been especially clear on the importance of "communal modes of
decision-making" and the need to consult multiple, competing perspectives. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, On
the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1924-
26(1988).
'' To be clear, we are not agreeing with Justice Stevens's view in his Spaziano dissent that only the
jury should be permitted to impose the death penalty. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 490 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). We argue only that the judge ought to emulate the jury when performing a
function traditionally-and for good reason-left to juries.
154 A few caveats are in order. Our argument may seem as relevant to evidence offered in
aggravation as it is to evidence offered in mitigation. After all, the sentencing agent must aim to capture
the community's outrage as well as its compassion. Does this not entail that, if a great many reasonable
persons believe that SED mitigates only if it was a specific cause of the crime, judges should give less
weight to such SED? The simple answer is no. Structurally, the capital sentencing process is designed to
be more responsive to the compassionate side of the community's moral response than to its vindictive
side. By requiring jury unanimity for death sentences, most states tilt the scales in favor of the
community's mercy. A single holdout vote for a life sentence generally has decisive power on a jury,
whereas a single vote for the death penalty is powerless. Moreover, while the Supreme Court prohibits
any constraints on the sentencing agent's authority to assess factors as mitigating, it has imposed
constitutional constraints on which factors may be regarded as aggravating. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 481
U.S. 279, 304 (1987) ("In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's
discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's
discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence.");
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (noting that a greater degree of reliability is required precisely
on the issue of death-deservingness). Indeed, the scope of potentially aggravating evidence must be
narrowly defined by statute. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("[To avoid a constitutional
flaw] an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared
to others found guilty of murder."). Moreover, whereas the imposition of death must enjoy broad moral
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Finally, it should be noted that our argument only extends to the moral
or normative evaluation of mitigating evidence. There remains substantial
room for judicial discounting of SED evidence on empirical grounds, and
judges are under no obligation to consider communal values when
reviewing the empirical facts. As mentioned above, the factual record may
sometimes lead a judge to reasonably question whether claimed
environmental deprivation actually occurred. In such cases, proffered SED
evidence may well be properly dismissed by the judge before the question of
moral significance even arises.
CONCLUSION
At critical junctures throughout the sentencing process, individual actors
are tasked with making moral determinations. Yet very little attention has
been paid to when this moral discretion is exercised correctly. That seems to
be changing, at least in the capital sentencing context, with appellate courts
being more willing to scrutinize sentencing decisions for failures to properly
"consider and give effect to" relevant mitigating evidence. We have
attempted to provide some clarity to this area of jurisprudence by closely
examining the nature of the moral consideration of mitigating evidence that
is required under constitutional law. Using the unusually restrictive
treatment of severe environmental deprivation evidence in some
jurisdictions as our starting point, we have devised a three-factor test for
determining when restrictive treatment of such evidence-the conditioning
of deprivation's mitigating potential on restrictive conditions like its being a
specific cause of the crime-represents an Eddings violation. Our test is
based on the principle, drawn from a long line of Supreme Court rulings,
that the sentencer cannot artificially limit her consideration of the mitigating
weight of evidence presented by the defense using legal rules, whether those
rules are derived from statute, prior case law, or judicial custom.
Additionally, we have argued that in light of the importance of ensuring that
the death penalty is sanctioned by communal values, sole sentencing judges
have an obligation to consider all of the possible ways in which SED might
be seriously mitigating-at least those that many reasonable jurors and
judges would endorse. In other words, unrestricted or broad consideration of
deprivation evidence is in general mandatory under constitutional law.
Between these two independent lines of constitutional argument, appellate
courts have more than enough basis for review of cases in Arizona,
Alabama, and wherever else restricted consideration of severe deprivation
evidence by sentencing judges has unfairly and unlawfully prejudiced
defendants convicted of capital crimes.
approval in order to be legitimate, the Supreme Court has never indicated that such broad appeal is
necessary for a life sentence. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Our argument
accordingly requires judges to take greater care in giving effect to the community's compassion than to
its vengeance. Although we have not discussed it here, there may be further reason for judicial deference
to merciful moral concerns discoverable in the fact that there are many members of society who do not
favor the death penalty under any circumstance.
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